The Failure Of The Deterrent Effect In The Indonesian Penal System For Corruptors

Abstract

Corruption in Indonesia is constructed as an extraordinary crime carrying severe criminal sanctions under Law Number 31 of 1999 as amended by Law Number 20 of 2001 on the Eradication of Corruption Crimes. However, the severity of these statutory threats has not proven sufficient to produce a deterrence effect among corruption offenders or potential offenders. This study aims to analyze the causes underlying the failure of deterrence within Indonesia's corruption sentencing system. The research employs a normative legal method using statutory, conceptual and case approaches, analyzed qualitatively through deductive reasoning. The findings indicate that the failure of deterrence is multidimensional, encompassing consistently light average sentences and stark disparities between cases with comparable state losses, as illustrated by the tin trade corruption case involving approximately IDR 300 trillion in state losses, in which the first-instance court imposed only six years and six months of imprisonment; low rates of state loss recovery through restitution mechanisms; lenient remission practices that allow corruption convicts to serve, on average, only a fraction of their imposed sentences; and inadequate regulation of corporate criminal liability. These findings demonstrate that deterrence is shaped more by the certainty and consistency of law enforcement than by the mere severity of statutory threats. This study recommends a reorientation of Indonesia's corruption sentencing policy, shifting from an approach centered on punitive severity toward strengthening enforcement certainty, binding sentencing guidelines, optimized asset recovery and reinforced independence of anti-corruption institutions.